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Abstract:
In recent years, there have been many attempts at
defining learning as a social phenomenon as oppo-
sed to an individual and primarily psychological
matter. The move towards understanding learning as
social processes has also altered the concept of
knowledge as a well–defined element stored in books,
brains, CD–Roms, disks, videos or on the Internet.
Instead, knowledge has been perceived as a social
and context related construction. The roots of the so-
cial angle within theories on learning and know-
ledge are much older than the current literature sug-
gests. This paper illustrates how these theories can
be traced back to pragmatism as a philosophy and
foundation for an educational approach introduced
by the American, John Dewey, more than one hun-
dred years ago. The paper also suggests that Dewey
avoids some pitfalls that have come with the new
theories, particularly the strong division between in-
dividual vs. social and school vs. everyday life
learning.
Introduction
In recent years, several researchers havecontested the validity of the cognitivelyinspired learning theory focusing on in-
dividuals (Brown, Collins & Duguid 1989;
Lave 1988; Salomon 1993). The view of
learning as an activity defined in time and
space, comprising communication, transfer
and acquisition of knowledge at certain
times in life, has been challenged. The view
that learning happens only limited to speci-
fic spaces and occasions, such as receiving
training or attending a course, reading a
book, working with a CD–Rom, on the In-
ternet or with an instruction video, has been
shown to be too limited. The new social
learning theories point to problems in un-
derstanding learning as an individual, cogni-
tive and delimited activity.
Instead, the new learning theories empha-
size that learning takes place when we par-




The Continuity of Action and
Thinking in Learning:
Re-visiting John Dewey
If we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming
fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature
and fellow men, philosophy may even be defined as the general
theory of education.
(Dewey 1916, c. 1966: 328).
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practice (Dreier 1999; Lave & Wenger
1991; Wenger 1998; Østerlund 1996). Lear-
ning takes place by participating in and re-
flecting on actions performed in socially
well organized settings, e.g., in some kind of
apprentice situation (Nielsen & Kvale 1999;
Schön 1983, 1987). Learning is a collective
phenomenon derived from actions and prac-
tice – and not primarily from the universe of
thought. In other words, learning is a life-
long project that goes on everywhere all the
time. According to the new social learning
theories, knowledge is constructed in com-
munities of practice as a result of concerted
actions across persons. In this approach,
learning and research on learning enter the
social and sociological field, stepping out of
the individual–oriented psychological sphere.
Although it has been liberating to add so-
cial considerations to the usual focus on in-
dividual learning, some versions of situated
learning have allowed social to stand in too
stark contrast to individual as if they were a
natural and essential dualism. Instead, I sug-
gest to view learning as both a deeply indi-
vidual and a collective phenomenon, and to
see learning as involving both action and
thinking, body and head, non–discursive
and language experiences. This view is in-
spired by the American pragmatist and edu-
cational thinker, John Dewey (1859–1952),
who developed a coherent concept of know-
ledge and learning by virtue of his concept
of experience.1
For sixty years, Dewey tried to reunite ac-
tion and thinking, the non–discursive and
the linguistic, and the physical and the cog-
nitive aspects of human experience as well
as learning in schools and in everyday life.
Of course, his thinking went through
changes, just as his life bore the marks of
shifts and changes. We must begin, there-
fore, with a small account of Dewey’s life.
For readers interested in knowing more
about his life there are many sources, some
of which are mentioned below. The remains
of the paper focus on the philosophical is-
sues. Opinions vary on how to sequence
Dewey’s philosophical and educational
thinking, because they are so closely related.
I have chosen to start with his philosophical
anchorage, namely, pragmatism, and to de-
velop secondly his educational thinking fo-
cused on two central concepts, namely, ex-
perience and inquiry.
Dewey – life and work
John Dewey lived a long and eventfullife and almost reached the age of 93.He was born into a middle–class family
on October 20, 1859, in Burlington, Ver-
mont, as the third of four sons. In 1879, De-
wey graduated from the University in Ver-
mont after which he taught at a high school
for a couple of years, simultaneously taking
private lessons in philosophy. Later, in 1882,
Dewey began to study philosophy at the
newly established Johns Hopkins University
in Baltimore, where he was introduced to
Friedrich Hegel’s (1770–1831) philosophy
thanks to his teacher, George S. Morris.
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1 In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in
Dewey – and pragmatism – from several quarters. It is
first and foremost due to Richard Rorty (1979, c. 1980,
1982) that pragmatism has been rediscovered as philoso-
phy, although his interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism
has provoked much criticism (see e.g., Stuhr 1993). In
Denmark, Dewey’s name is sometimes mentioned in pas-
sing in connection with various writings on education and
pedagogy. The comments are rarely positive and of-
ten superficial (Illeris, Laursen & Simonsen 1978; Illeris
1999), although there are exceptions (e.g. Winther–Jen-
sen 1998). Presumably, it is not due to the scarce number
of Scandinavian translations of Dewey. Although only
two of Dewey’s books have been translated into Danish
(Fink 1969), the interest in studying Dewey’s philosophy
and educational thoughts is much greater in Sweden and
Norway (Lundgren 1989; Løvlie 1989).
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Dewey himself interprets his fascination of
Hegel as a need to understand the world as a
coherent whole rather than a place for
“atomic individualism and sensationalistic
empiricism” (Dewey 1930, here from Bern-
stein 1960: 9). Dewey also describes his at-
traction to Hegel’s philosophy as a personal
need he felt in his first years as a budding
philosopher. Dewey writes:
[Hegel’s thought] supplied a demand for unifica-
tion that was doubtless an intense emotional
craving, and yet was a hunger that only an intel-
lectualised subject matter could satisfy. It is more
than difficult, it is impossible, to recover that ear-
ly mood. But the sense of divisions and separati-
ons that were, I suppose, borne in upon me as a
consequence of a heritage of New England cultu-
re, divisions by way of isolation of self from
world, of soul from body, of nature from God,
brought a painful oppression – or, rather, they
were an inward laceration. My earlier philoso-
phic study had been an intellectual gymnastic.
Hegel’s synthesis of subject and object, matter
and spirit, the divine and the human, was, how-
ever, no mere intellectual formula; it operated as
an immense release, a liberation.
(Dewey 1930, here from Bernstein 1960: 10).
Here, in his only autobiographic work,
Dewey looks back, at the age of 70, at how
his thinking and life as a philosopher have
developed – with all the rationalisations of
the intervening years. With the wisdom of
hindsight, Dewey understands that Hegel
led him away from a philosophising prima-
rily consisting of intellectual exercises to a
way of thinking that also touched his emo-
tional universe. Hegel brought clarity and
order into Dewey’s feelings – from “inward
laceration” to an “immense release” – and
not only to his intellect.
Hegel’s understanding of the individual’s
connectedness to history, culture and envi-
ronment appealed both intellectually and
emotionally to Dewey. The conception of
connection, continuity, and coherence fol-
lowed Dewey all his life, although in anoth-
er form than Hegel’s. Later in life, Dewey
was influenced by Darwin’s evolutionary
thinking and that time’s functional, so-
cial–psychological understanding of the in-
dividual. This led him to see coherence as a
synthesis between the human “existence”
(Dewey’s term) and its biological and social
environments. In Dewey’s conception, the
coherence was taken from Hegel’s “absolute
spirit” and placed in the secular, human,
physical, and social existence.
One of Dewey’s students, Max Eastman
(1945, c. 1959), indicates that before Dewey
began studying philosophy at Johns Hopkins,
he had a “mystic experience” by which he
understood that the religious – or spiritual –
aspect was part of life itself and not some-
thing outside or above life. Dewey had this
experience in Oil City, Pennsylvania, where
he taught a high school. Eastman writes:
One evening while he sat reading he had what he
called a “mystic experience.” It was an answer to
that question which still worried him: whether he
really meant business when he prayed. It was not
a very dramatic mystic experience. There was no
vision, not even a definable emotion – just a su-
premely blissful feeling that his worries were
over. Mystic experiences in general, Dewey ex-
plained, are purely emotional and cannot be con-
veyed in words. But when he tried to convey his
in words, it came out like this: “What the hell are
you worrying about, anyway? Everything that’s
here is here, and you can just lie back on it.”
(Eastman 1945, c. 1959: 256–57).
The focus on Dewey’s relationship to the re-
ligious and spiritual aspect must be seen in
the context of the time (the end of nine-
teenth century), when it was mostly theolo-
gians and clergymen who occupied them-
selves with philosophy. Things were differ-
ent at Johns Hopkins, where Dewey formal-
ly studied philosophy, but the entire philo-
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Morris not only introduced Dewey to
Hegel; he was also a source of inspiration
for Dewey’s later interest in logic. In the
1880’s, Dewey and Morris developed an
“intermediate kind of logic that was neither
merely formal nor a logic of inherent ‘truth’
of the constitution of things; a logic of the
processes by which knowledge is reached”
(Jane Dewey 1939, c. 1951: 18). This is
what Dewey and several Dewey researchers
have called “the logic of experience”, be-
cause the origin of knowledge is precisely
living experience and not the other way
around, as if logical theorems might govern
thinking (McDermott 1973, c. 1981; Sleeper
1986).
Morris not only supported Dewey’s emo-
tional and intellectual development, but his
personal life as well. In 1884, he was instru-
mental in getting Dewey a position at Mi-
chigan University in Ann Arbor, where he
met his first wife, Alice Chipman
(1859–1927). John and Alice were married
in 1886 and had six children in addition to a
child they adopted when one of their own
children, Gordon, died at the age of eight.
Dewey’s wife is often given the credit for
opening his philosophical interest from clas-
sical philosophy towards the social field and
his lifelong interest in the “democratic pro-
ject” (Jane Dewey op.cit.; Westbrook 1991).
Ten years later, in 1894, Dewey moved
from Michigan to the newly established
Chicago University, where he became head
of the Department of Philosophy, which in-
cluded psychology and pedagogy. This in-
ter–disciplinary challenge was the major
reason Dewey accepted a move from Ann
Arbor in Michigan to the University of Chi-
cago. It was here that John Dewey and his
wife created a school, later known as the
Laboratory School (Hendley 1986; Tanner
1997), where he tested his ideas on peda-
gogy. In 1904, the university leadership
made some decisions about the future of the
Laboratory School without consulting De-
wey. As a result, Dewey resigned immedi-
ately and took up a position as Professor in
Philosophy at Columbia University in New
York. Here, he stayed until he retired in
1930, only interrupted by a number of trav-
els to Japan, China, Turkey, Mexico and the
Soviet Union. As a matter of curiosity, I
mention only that Dewey in 1937 was chair-
man for a court of inquiry, the “Trotsky
Hearings”, that took place in Diego Rivera’s
house in Coyacan on the outskirts of Mexico
City.
In 1927, Dewey’s wife died at the age of
68 from arteriosclerosis. After 41 years of
married life, which also included a work re-
lationship, e.g. the Laboratory School, it
was a great loss to Dewey. Dewey’s children
took care of him until 1946, when he mar-
ried a forty–two–year old woman, Roberta
Lowitz Grant. At that time, Dewey was 87
years old. John and Roberta adopted two
Belgian children, a brother and a sister, John
and Adrienne, who had been orphaned dur-
ing the Second World War (Dykhuizen
1973). Shortly before his 92nd birthday in
1951, Dewey broke his hip while playing
with John and Adrienne. He healed very
slowly and was locked up in his apartment
during the whole winter and the spring
months of 1951–52. When the weather per-
mitted, he was wheeled out in his wheel-
chair, but he never learned to walk again. On
Saturday, May 31, Dewey had another at-
tack of pneumonia and died at 7 a.m. on
June 1 1952 in his apartment on 5th Avenue
in New York City.
Pragmatism
For Dewey, philosophy was closely re-lated to educational thinking – orlearning, which I assume is the con-
cept Dewey would have used today. The re-
lationship between a philosophy comprising
88
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a certain view of real life, a corresponding
concept of knowledge and an understanding
of human action constitutes the basis for a
“general theory on education” (Dewey
1916, c. 1966: 328). Conversely, if the theo-
ry on education does not build on a coherent
understanding of reality, knowledge and hu-
man action, there is a risk that the pedagogic
will turn into barren principles and tech-
niques.
Dewey’s philosophical – and thus his pe-
dagogical – point of departure is the living
experience of everyday life. According to
Dewey, philosophy is to be understood in
terms of the problems with which it deals,
and these problems originate in the conflicts
and difficulties of social life.
The problems are such things as the relations of
mind and matter; body and soul; humanity and
physical nature; the individual and the social;
theory – or knowing, and practice – or doing.
(Dewey 1916, c. 1966: 324).
It is on this foundation that Dewey’s version
of pragmatism builds and develops a philo-
sophical system. When we use the term
“pragmatic” in our everyday speech about a
person’s actions, it implies that he or she
acts from a results oriented, non–ideological
basis. In popular speech version of pragma-
tic, neither the reasoned value nor the moral
worth of an activity is important as long as
the intended results can be achieved. In rela-
tion to the philosophical meaning of prag-
matism, this is a distorting and ironic sim-
plification. Even in philosophical circles,
the meaning of pragmatism is not unam-
biguous.
Pragmatism has had several architects
over the years, and there have been many in-
terpreters (see e.g. Bernstein 1960; Childs
1956; Dworkin 1959; Garforth 1966; Has-
kins & Seiple 1999; Rorty op. cit.; Scheffler
1974, c. 1986; Sleeper 1986). The early prag-
matists were Charles S. Peirce (1839–
1914), William James (1842–1910), George
H. Mead (1863–1931) and then John Dewey.
Dewey is the pragmatist who has been given
credit for linking pragmatism to actual edu-
cational thinking. He used pragmatism to
prescribe and practice measures of content
and pedagogical initiatives in the school sys-
tem (Dewey 1916, c. 1966). Often, Dewey
employs the concepts “instrumentalism”
and “experimentalism” to describe his ver-
sion of pragmatism (Dewey 1931, here from
McDermott 1973, c. 1981, Dewey 1933, c.
1986). An important feature in pragmatism
is that ideas, theories and concepts – i.e. dif-
ferent forms of thinking and abstraction –
function as instruments for actions.
(…) thinking is a process of inquiry, of looking
into things, of investigating. Acquiring is always
secondary, and instrumental to the act of inquiry.
It is seeking, a quest, for something that is not at
hand.
(Dewey 1916, c. 1966: 148).
Thinking functions to generate working hy-
potheses, the consequences of which are
tested in actions that therefore can be seen
as experimental. Experimental actions based
on the concept of knowledge in pragmatism
are not merely examples of “trial–and–er-
ror” actions. They are actions governed by
an idea or a hypothesis. The nature of ac-
tions is always delimited or selective, be-
cause we cannot act in general, nor in a va-
cuum. The essence of action is irremediably
contextual. It follows that thinking and ideas
or meanings developed through thinking are
contextual as well. Thus, a reflected action
is created in relation to a specific situation
or problem. This interconnectedness be-
tween thinking and action is also evident in
Dewey’s concept of experience and in his
concept of inquiry.
Pragmatism is a philosophy clearly root-
ed in the everyday life of the turn of the cen-
tury America (from the nineteenth to the
89
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twentieth century). At the same time, prag-
matism also springs from European philoso-
phy and the scientific developments of the
time – especially within biology (the theory
of evolution) and psychology (functiona-
lism). At the turn of the century, the USA
still showed traces of being the “new” world
to which many people emigrated out of ne-
cessity or love of adventure. The emigrants
started on a new life in the new country;
they had left behind European class–divided
societies based on traditions and family re-
lations.
The new – and also slightly older – Ame-
ricans were oriented towards the future.
They lived in a country where the western
frontiers were still open and alluring. At the
time, the USA was a country where indus-
trialisation and mass production slowly
were affecting the development of society.
The turn of the century was a time marked
by changes and insecurities. Rhetorically
anyway, people had to prove their worth by
their own actions and values instead of be-
ing born into a more or less privileged fam-
ily. Above all, at this time, the USA showed
signs of optimism and belief in progress and
development (Childs op. cit.; Scheffler op.
cit.).
Similarly, the development of pragmatism
should also be seen in continuation of – and
as a reconstruction of – the European histo-
ry of philosophy.2 As the first of the archi-
tects of American pragmatism who used the
term pragmatism, Peirce is indebted to the
German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–
1804). In his writings, Kant had made a dis-
tinction between the concepts “pragmatic”
and “practical”. Kant used the term “practi-
cal” to describe rules and concepts within
the realm of moral philosophy, where it is
possible to acquire knowledge a priori that
is, without reference to human experience.
According to Kant, inquiry into the a priori
offers a method to establish transcendental
and logical truths. Kant applied the term
“pragmatic”, to the fields of art and tech-
nique as these areas stem from human expe-
rience and should be regarded as a posteri-
ori. They comprise knowledge that refers di-
rectly to human experience.
The pragmatists shared a view of human
existence as being continuously formed and
forming itself and its surroundings. This is
why we talk of action as transactional in-
stead of just interactional.3 Contrary to other
living beings, humans can use their ability to
act more and more informed – or “intelli-
gent” which was the word Dewey used – in
an effort to improve their surroundings.
Dewey’s use of the term intelligence must
not be confused with today’s use of the con-
cept, which often gives associations to intel-
ligence tests and differences in intelligence
as something hereditary and natural. De-
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2 One of Dewey’s books is called Reconstruction in
Philosophy (1920, c. 1936). The book is based on De-
wey’s lectures at the Imperial University in Tokyo in
1919. It is also one of the two books that has been trans-
lated into Danish by Hans Fink (op. cit.). The other book
is a translation of the diminuitive Experience and
Education (1938, c. 1963).
3 Late in life, Dewey characterized what he had previ-
ously called interaction as transaction. In his latest book,
Knowing and the Known (1949, c. 1991 with Arthur F.
Bentley), he writes the following about transaction: “The
knowing–known taken as one process in cases in which in
older discussions the knowings and knowns are separated
and viewed as in interaction.” (op. cit.: 272). Further, de-
finitions from Oxford Dictionary are cited: “Transactions:
doings, proceedings, dealings. Interaction: reciprocal ac-
tion or influence of persons or things on each other.” (op.
cit.: 265). In 1960, Bernstein writes the following about
Dewey’s shift from applying interaction to transaction:
“Transaction is a refinement of interaction. In a transac-
tion, the components themselves are subject to change.
Their character affects and is affected by the transaction.
Properly speaking, they are not independent: they are
phases in a unified transaction. Thus transaction is a more
rigorous formulation of the category of the organic which
is embedded in Dewey’s earliest philosophic writings.
Transaction is a generic trait of existence.” (Bernstein
op.cit.: xl).
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wey’s concept of intelligence reflects that
human beings can consciously use their ex-
perience, their knowledge, to form them-
selves and their surroundings.
The pragmatic reconstruction of the
knowledge concept from resting partly on a
priori theorems to resting fully on human
experience did not interest Dewey if the re-
construction could not be used to change
and improve people’s intellectual and moral
orientation. Thus, pragmatism is also, in-
deed primarily, a method by virtue of its
concept of inquiry. It is a means to solve
problems and improve the world. According
to the pragmatists, and especially to Dewey,
the hope of a better world rests on people’s
efforts to construct a world in which pro-
ductive reflection becomes possible. Ac-
cording to Dewey, it means to reason intelli-
gently and subsequently to act intelligently.
This is the way we learn, and therefore the
exercise in using thinking as an instrument
in experimental action is the core in De-
wey’s educational thinking.
Educational thinking
As mentioned before, Dewey consi-dered philosophy to be “the generaltheory on education”. In continua-
tion of this view, Dewey looked at education
as “the laboratory in which philosophic dis-
tinctions become concrete and are tested”
(Dewey 1916, c. 1966: 329). According to
Dewey, philosophy has the practical func-
tion, because it can direct the formation of
new experiences through a stringent inquiry
into the past and present. Dewey did not
claim that methods from natural science
could be applied directly to human affairs,
but that “intelligent action” or a “scientific
attitude” ought to be part of all human life.
The scientific attitude implies a willingness
to engage in inquiry in order to solve an un-
certain situation. Education is the means to
examine previous experiences and reflect on
the relevance of their values (Dewey 1916,
c. 1966: 328).
Dewey applied the ideas of functional
psychology and his instrumentalist theory of
knowledge to his theories on education.
These theories Dewey tested in his Labora-
tory School during the eight years he was
the head of the school. According to func-
tional psychology, life and learning are so-
cial phenomena. The intellect is viewed as a
function of social life and cannot function in
isolation or develop by itself. To allow an in-
tellect to develop requires continuous stimu-
lation from the surroundings. In the process,
human experience is developed and im-
proved. The sociality of learning and educa-
tion thus pervades Dewey’s thinking. Sepa-
rated from each other, the individual and so-
ciety are merely abstractions. Actual learn-
ing regardless of whether in the form of edu-
cation or life as a whole takes place in the
transaction between the individual and his/
her surroundings.
Dewey strongly rejected the idea that
education is merely “preparation”. Of
course, we might say that Dewey’s instru-
mentalism is preparation for the future, but
this meaning differs from what we normally
understand by education as preparations,
namely, preparations for another education,
a job, etc. For Dewey, education – or learn-
ing – is a reconstruction of experience, it is
a continuous unfolding of potential where
each step is a “preparation” for the next. For
pragmatism, unlike the way most education-
al theorists like to think and most schools
operate, the future goals of unfolding expe-
rience are never known in advance – at least
not in their final form, because they are ap-
proached experimentally and formed by
testing the consequences.
Dewey attacks every attempt at educating
for performance objectives determined in
advance and out of context, e.g. by imagin-
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ing the conditions under which the new ex-
periences will be used. If education is
planned in such a way, it implies that the
skills achieved at one time can be trans-
ferred efficiently and applied at a later time
and under quite different conditions. Long
in anticipation of the new social learning
theories, Dewey claimed that an automatic
transfer of learning does not exist. Rather,
education should be based on experiences
that the learning individuals already have
and intend to develop further. Dewey con-
sidered it contradictory to apply the present
as a means to prepare for the future. We can
only prepare for the future by trying to un-
derstand the time in which we play a part:
We always live at the time we live and not at
some other time, and only by extracting at each
present time the full meaning of each present ex-
perience are we prepared for doing the same
thing in the future. This is the only preparation
which in the long run amounts to anything.
(Dewey 1938, c. 1963: 49).
Dewey criticises not only the established
educational system, but also the different
forms of progressivism within educational
thinking and pedagogy, with which he has
sometimes been identified (see e.g. Illeris,
Laursen, Simonsen op. cit.). It is important
to point out that Dewey repeatedly rejected
any association to the “Progressive Edu-
cation Association” (PEA) established in
1919, although in 1928, he consented to be-
come honorary president of the organisa-
tion. He used the occasion to underline the
necessity of intellectual rigor in the refor-
mation of the educational system, advocated
by the progressive educational thinkers, if
the movement wanted to be taken seriously.
Unfortunately, Dewey’s warnings had little
effect on those who called themselves his
successors.
As a social movement, progressivism ele-
vated the individual’s present experience
over humanity’s collective historical experi-
ences, and it never gave a positive formula-
tion of the role of cummulative knowledge
and authority in human affairs. Progressi-
vism was not sufficiently aware of the dan-
gers built into their concept of freedom,
which could easily be misinterpreted as lais-
sez–faire pedagogy. In other words, it
placed too much emphasis on the individual
child’s present needs and impulses at the ex-
pense of the collective and historically de-
termined experiences (Dewey 1938, c. 1963).
This one–sided focus on the learning subject
without any thought for the content of the
learning process and its use in the social
world conflicted with Dewey’s ideas about
people using their individual and collective
experiences to act progressively more in-
formed and intelligent.
The concept of experience
Dewey emphasised the experimentalnature of the concept of experience,and the relation of experience to
reason, emotion, and the organization of a
future.4 For Dewey, experience deals with
transactions between a living person and its
physical and social surroundings. By sur-
roundings, Dewey does not mean a nature
separate from human activity, nor is activity
isolated from its situation in the world.
Surroundings are experiences, and experi-
ences are achieved reflexively in transaction
with the surroundings. In other words, expe-
rience is simultaneously a product, a content
and a process, a method.
92
4 Dewey developed his concept of experience practical-
ly all his life. This paper is based on Dewey’s develop-
ment from the essay The Postulate of Immediate Em-
piricism (1905, c. 1981) to his work with the concept re-
flective experience in the book Democracy and Edu-
cation (1916, c. 1966). Other important books about his
concept of experience are Experience and Nature (1925,
c. 1958) and Art as Experience (1934, c. 1958).
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[…] experience is of as well as in nature. It is not
experience which is experienced, but nature –
stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, tempera-
ture, electricity, and so on. Things interacting in
certain ways are experience; they are what is ex-
perienced. Linked in certain other ways with
another natural object – the human organism –
they are how things are experienced as well.
Experiences thus reaches down into nature; it has
depth. It also has breadth and to an indefinitely
elastic extent. It stretches. That stretch consti-
tutes inference.
(Dewey 1925, c. 1958: 4a).
The scene, the setting, the situation, the con-
text, the transaction, all refer to the mutual
formation of humans at work with their sur-
roundings. The surroundings live their own
life; they are subject to their own relations,
which of course we experience. But the mu-
tual formation of human activities and their
surroundings also goes beyond the given
surroundings. The crux of the human situa-
tion is that we can inquire into and trans-
form how we experience and what we expe-
rience. For Dewey, life itself means to be in-
volved in the transactions that constitute ex-
perience. Experience is a life process that
continuously moves, as new problems are an
incentive to intelligent – i.e., reflective – ac-
tions and thus new experiences. Education
in the sense of “schooling” is a specialised
form of experience that aims to govern the
process, to make it more profitable than if
the individual had been left on his/her own.
Content is inseparable from method. As
experience is transactional, intelligent ac-
tion is governed by the action’s aim. Trans-
action is a refinement of the concept “inter-
action”. In a transaction, the components
themselves are subject to change. Their na-
ture affects and is affected by the transac-
tion. More precisely, they are not indepen-
dent – they are phases in a united transac-
tion. Transaction is a common feature in our
existence. There is no gap between them.
Method is simply the intellect’s efforts to
work with the content of experience regard-
less of whether it is provided by the school
system or by chance through life in general.
It follows that we should think less of teach-
ing methods than of methods for learning
and experience.
In the first place, experience involves the
principle of continuity (Dewey 1938, c.
1963). It implies that all present experiences
grow out of past experiences, which in turn
leads to future experiences. We do not enter
an educational or learning process as a blank
page. We have experiences we bring with us
into the learning process. Secondly, the prin-
ciple of interaction is involved.5 It means
that experiences are created in the interac-
tion between individual qualifications and
social conditions. Expressed differently, the
learning process deals with the relation be-
tween the individual and the surroundings.
Learning – development and change of hu-
man beings – takes place in the transaction
between the individual and the situations
that he/she is part of. It is through this trans-
action that experiences are created.
The provocative element in experience,
i.e. the element that arouses the intelligence
and puts it to work, is to face an uncertain or
problematic situation. When habitual ac-
tions are upset, it creates the basis for gain-
ing new experiences. The difficulties and
problems must originate in the learning sub-
ject’s previous experiences. They must not
be forced upon her from the outside, and
they should be within her capacity of solv-
ing problems. As a result of inquiries into
problematic situations, we gain new experi-
ences. We construct new knowledge, that
depends partly on our ability to reflect on
the relation between our actions and their
consequences, partly on the relations we can
establish to our previous experiences. How-
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5 Dewey was still using the concept of “interaction” in
1938.
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ever, some experiences may not be appre-
hended as such, i.e. they do not enter our
conscious and verbal sphere. Dewey talks a
great deal about the aesthetics of experi-
ences and the sensation that they perfect or
complete – at least for a time. Any delight
and comfort in a situation is also an experi-
ence (McDermott op. cit.). There is little
distinction between an intellect that knows
and a body that acts. Along the continuum
of experience, there is a vague transfer be-
tween non–cognitive and cognitive experi-
ences that is crucial to learning. If we want
to learn from our experiences, we must get
them out of the physical and non–discursive
field and turn them into acknowledged and
conscious experiences.
To “learn from experience” is to make a
backward and forward connection between what
we do to things and what we enjoy or suffer from
things in consequence. Under such conditions,
doing becomes a trying; an experiment with the
world to find out what it is like; the undergoing
becomes instruction – discovery of the connecti-
on of things. Two conclusions important for edu-
cation follow. (1) Experience is primarily an acti-
ve–passive affair; it is not primarily cognitive.
But (2) the measure of the value of an experience
lies in the perception of relationships or continu-
ities to which it leads up. It includes cognition in
the degree in which it is cumulative or amounts
to something, or has meaning.
(Dewey 1916, c. 1966: 140).
We gain our experiences as a result of how
we live our lives and how we associate with
other people. This, in turn, depends on who
we are as persons and how we enter into
these relations, but it is difficult to avoid
gaining any experiences. But if we are going
to learn from our experiences, we have to
use our ability not only to contemplate the
relation between our actions and their con-
sequences, but also to relate them to our pre-
sent experiences. Only at this point do our
experiences turn into reflective experiences
– learning experiences. It is in our efforts to
become aware of our experiences that we
can use them to act in a more intelligent and
future–oriented manner, and it is here that
education comes into the picture. A teacher
or a more experienced person can help the
learning subject in his/her efforts to reflect
consciously.
Dewey emphasises the continuity be-
tween immediate, non–discursive experi-
ence and people’s cognitive and intellectual
experience. He stresses the cognitive role of
non–discursive experience, just as thinking
– or consciousness – may be used to change,
e.g., bad physical habits (Shusterman 1994,
c. 1999).6 We reflect all the time when we
evaluate, oppose, search and find – such ac-
tivities are not reserved for special situa-
tions. We are changeable creatures and crea-
tures with a conscious capacity to experi-
ence. An experience may function as a dra-
ma or a narrative: “I dare say that was an ex-
perience!” It takes us beyond our normal
state of consciousness.
Inquiry
The concept of inquiry in pragmatismdeveloped out of the criticism leveledat the concept of knowledge in for-
mal logic with its references to a priori
knowledge above and beyond the human
world of experience. Early in his career,
Dewey was looking for a logic closer to hu-
man experience:
94
6 Dewey was inspired by F. Matthias Alexander, the in-
ventor of the “Alexander technique”, a therapy in which
an experienced teacher attempts to make people con-
scious of their bad physical habits by making them stand,
walk, lie down, sit and get up in ways that are more suit-
ed for the human body. It is a method using consciousness
to change physical habits. Dewey wrote the preface to
several of Alexander’s books, e.g. Alexander (1923, c.
1983).
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Any book of formal logic will tell us what this
conception of thought is: thought is a faculty or
an entity existing in the mind, apart from facts,
having its own fixed forms, with which facts
have nothing to do – except in so far as to pass
under the yoke.
(Dewey 1891, c. 1969: 127).
In fact, Dewey completely rejected the con-
cept of knowledge and chose to employ the
term “warranted assertibilities” to indicate
the contextual and continuous nature of
knowledge (Dewey 1890A; 1890B, c. 1969;
1938, c. 1949: 7ff). Dewey argued that all
logical forms originate in inquiry, which at
the same time is a verification process for
proper statements in a pragmatically defined
knowledge (Dewey 1938, c. 1949: 3–4, see
also Burke 1994).7
Dewey’s development of logic as a theory
of inquiry is based on our everyday life ex-
periences. Inquiry cannot be reduced to a re-
sponse to purely abstract thoughts as it is an-
chored in situations as part of our everyday
life. It is part of life to inquire, turn things
around intellectually, come to conclusions
and make evaluations. We do it all the time
whether we know it or not. This is how we
learn and become cognizant human beings.
According to Dewey, a theory on logic can
only be relevant if it deals with the way in
which inquiry is done, taking into account
that facts and ideas are related to each other.
Ideas must be used to understand facts. It is
in the process of trying to understand the
world to which we belong that ideas are
used. Ideas only create meaning if they are
related to facts. This is how ideas are born.
It is not a matter of getting the ideas first and
then finding the facts. Ideas and facts de-
velop together and together they constitute
our knowledge about the world and tell us
who we are in this world. A situation is ne-
ver a single object or event or a set of ob-
jects and events.
For we never experience nor form judgements
about objects and events in isolation, but only in
connection with a contextual whole. This latter is
what is called a ‘situation’.
(Dewey 1938, c. 1949: 66).
The uncertain situation is open for inquiry in
the sense that its constituting elements are at
first unconnected. The clarified situation is
the result of inquiry, and the situation closes
for a while. In the interval between an un-
certain and a clarified situation, we apply
discourse by using symbols as means. We
communicate with each other and ourselves
when we experience an uncertain situation
that we wish to or have to solve. These un-
certain situations relate to everyday life. If
we are driving and approach a crossroads,
we must choose which road to take; a thick-
er example might be writing an article where
we keep negotiating with ourselves and per-
haps with others about what to include and
exclude.
According to Dewey, science does not
have access to other methods than the me-
thods by which we orient ourselves in our
everyday world. In both situations, the me-
thod of inquiry is used. The only way in-
quiry in everyday life differs from scientific
inquiry is in terms of content. Everyday life
inquiries deal with more practical situations.
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7 Dewey’s study of logic culminated in his book Logic:
The Theory of Inquiry (1938, c. 1949). The book was pub-
lished when Dewey was nearly 80 years old and is the re-
sult of a life’s work. Dewey began his study of logic in
1890 by writing two articles “Is Logic a Dualistic
Science?” and “The Logic of Verification” (1890A; 1890B,
c. 1969). In an article written approximately ten years later
“Some Stages of Logical Thought” (1900, c. 1976), Dewey
anticipated the structure of inquiry, which he later related
to education in the book How We Think (1910, c. 1978, re-
vised in 1933, c. 1986). The latter essay, his four contribu-
tions to the book Studies in Logical Theory (1903, c. 1976),
and six other essays published on logic were in the book
Essays in Experimental Logic (1916). These essays cannot
be found throughout his Collected Works (Boydston ed.
1969–1991) as each essay has been published under the
year it was first published.
outlines-2000.qxd  23-11-00  12:55  Side 95
Bente Elkjaer: The Continuity of Action and Thinking in Learning
The inquiries are not primarily intellectual
actions, and the solution is related to a spe-
cific context or group. Scientific inquiry is
often of a more general nature.
Inquiry has a common structure or pattern
regardless of whether it is used in everyday
life or in science. Dewey describes inquiry
as a process that starts with a sense that
something is wrong. Intuitively, we suspect
there is a problem. The suspicion does not
necessarily arise from an intellectual wit. It
is not until the inquirer(s) begin to define
and formulate the problem that inquiry
moves into an intellectual field by using the
human ability to reason and think verbally.
In other words, the inquirer(s) use their pre-
vious experiences from similar situations.
According to Dewey, the inquirer(s) try to
solve the problem by applying different
working hypotheses and conclude by testing
a model of solution. The initial feeling of
uncertainty, the uncertainty that started the
inquiry process must disappear before we
can say the problem has been solved. If the
inquiry is to lead to new experiences, it re-
quires thoughts or reflection over the rela-
tion between the problem’s definition and
formulation and the solution. It is not until
reflection has established a relation between
the action and the consequence(s) of the ac-
tion that learning takes place.
The legacy of Dewey
Already early in life, Dewey saw howphilosophical thinking helped himto understand his experience of dis-
integration and separation. Hegel – and later
Darwin’s theory of evolution and the func-
tional psychology’s social orientation –
helped Dewey to understand that the world
is a unity consisting of the conscious and in-
telligent activities of individual persons.
Nothing in the world is outside or above hu-
man experience. The individual and the
community cannot improve their ability to
develop the world by turning to lofty and
transcendental doctrines, but solely by act-
ing and learning from experience, enabling
them to act even more informed and wisely
in future situations.
This personal realisation of unity founded
in everyday life was the starting point for the
development of Dewey’s philosophical think-
ing and action. It is the basis for the experi-
ence–based concept of knowledge in prag-
matism, and it is the background for
Dewey’s view on the importance of educa-
tion. Dewey’s concept of experience is a
concept of transaction by which experience
can simultaneously change persons and sur-
roundings. Experience is not at root con-
scious or verbal, but it can be enhanced by
conscious reflection. Dewey’s concept of in-
quiry is directly linked to the pragmatic con-
cept of knowledge and the concept of expe-
rience. Inquiry is a method to acquire expe-
rience, to construct knowledge. Inquiry is
the method we use in everyday life, and at
the same time the method can be applied in
the construction of intended learning pro-
cesses.
There is no contradiction between De-
wey’s thinking and the new social learning
theories when they postulate that learning
takes place as a result of participating in and
across social communities of practice and
that learning is enhanced by reflections over
actions in, say, apprentice situations. For
Dewey, learning is also a collective and life-
long phenomenon not confined to institu-
tionalised educational environments. De-
wey’s contribution is first and foremost an
understanding that connect philosophy and
learning. His philosophy of reality, know-
ledge and actions, each in relation to each
other, has left a clear mark on his educatio-
nal thinking. Where new social learning the-
ories emphasise participation in action and
practice, Dewey stresses experience. Expe-
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rience includes active participation in prac-
tice as well as the subsequent consequences.
But to turn this process into a learning expe-
rience, the learning subject must actively
establish the connection, including the con-
nection to his/her previous experiences. It
means that Dewey underlines the impor-
tance of reflection or thinking, the cognitive
field, much more than the social learning
theories do. He sees thinking as simultane-
ously a result of reflection over experimen-
tal actions and an instrument for future ac-
tions. Thinking is, in Dewey’s words “a dis-
tinctive experience”, it is the “institutional
endeavor to discover specific connections
between something that we do and the con-
sequences which result, so that the two be-
come continuous” (Dewey 1916, c. 1966:
145).
Establishing thinking as an instrument for
experimental action is captured in Dewey’s
concept of inquiry as the way in which
people acquire knowledge. At the same
time, it is a method for creating learning
processes where active knowledge construc-
tion takes place. Dewey argues that we live
an everyday life in which we learn, but also
have the opportunity to create intended
learning processes. He does not see the
same contradiction between scholastic
learning processes and learning processes
through participation in practice, which is a
feature of some new social learning theories.
Dewey believes that the educational system
can be used as a laboratory for inquiry and,
thus, as a place for acquiring experiences.8
By means of his concept of experience,
Dewey is also able to establish an actual re-
lation between individual and social aspects.
On the one side, experiences are always in-
dividual, but they derive from our common,
collective world of experience. Learning
must be viewed as a relation between the in-
dividual and the social element – both the
individual person and the community are
participants in the learning processes. In the
social learning theories, the individual tends
to disappear as a category in favour of the
social communities of practice. As a conse-
quence, the learning subject disappears out
of the picture. We might say that Dewey dis-
solves the artificial distinction between so-
cialisation and learning as he regards the
two concepts solely as analytic categories
that can be used in a conceptual battle by in-
stitutions ready to make use of one or the
other. There is no learning without socialisa-
tion and vice versa. Both activities take
place in the established school and educa-
tional system and in everyday life.
Conclusion
The purpose of this article is to pointout how new social learning theoriesran parallel to a long historical tradi-
tion within philosophical thinking and peda-
gogy.9 American pragmatism in general and
John Dewey’s understanding of knowledge
and learning in particular are concrete ex-
amples to the extent they insist on a unity
and interdependence between the collective
society and the individual person and a phi-
losophy of knowledge based on active in-
quiry and ever emergent experience.
I conclude by indicating how new social
learning theories may learn from Dewey’s
anti–dualism. The issue is not a confronta-
tion with the activity of thinking (or “cogni-
tion”) in favour of action and practice, but
an understanding of thinking as a tool for
action and not as something elevated and
outside the human world of experience. I
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8 This does not prevent Dewey from being a harsh critic
of the traditional schooling system; see e.g. Dewey 1899,
rev. 1915, c. 1976.
9 See also the very insightful article by Eric Bredo
(1997) on this topic.
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think that it is necessary to keep in mind that
the proponents of the new social learning
theories argue against a very limited under-
standing of cognition. That is, to view think-
ing as abstracted from everyday life, and to
view cognition as a general ability easily
transferred from school–learning to every-
day use of skills.10 This understanding of
thinking and cognition derives from the un-
derstanding of knowledge according to for-
mal logic with its a priori propositions and
categories. It is excactly this understanding
of cognition that Dewey’s work on logic
sought to overcome. Dewey argues for an
understanding of knowledge, which derives
from human experience (human action and
reflection), and not from an understanding
of knowledge abstracted from human expe-
rience.
The learning from Dewey is to see the re-
lation between action or practice and think-
ing. Practice is always contextual, and so is
thinking, which implies that the idea of first
learning abstract models and then to apply
them on practice has to be rejected. The ap-
parent difference between the new social
learning theories and Dewey’s philosophical
and educational thinking regarding the value
of school–learning is connected to the
above. Traditional school–learning with its
emphasis on abstract thinking is regarded by
Dewey as detrimental to learning. Accord-
ing to Dewey, and I believe to many pro-
ponents of new social learning theories,
schools can be used to further and enhance
the processes of having learning experien-
ces. But in order to do so, education should
be organised not through a fixed curriculum
but as experiments with and of the social
world of which school is a part.
Dewey’s educational thinking as well as
his educational practice, i.e., his Laboratory
School, saw daylight around the 19th centu-
ry turning into the 20th century. Dewey’s
model of everyday life was in many ways
rural America, i.e., the American farm house
as a model with all the everyday tasks
around this to be learned (cooking, garden-
ing, building a hut, etc.). The content of the
Laboratory School did not reflect the ap-
proaching industrial age at the time. Given
this background, one could for very good
reasons question the relevance of Dewey’s
educational thinking for a knowledge soci-
ety. Is Dewey still relevant apart from what
I have already argued in terms of the rela-
tions between new social learning theories
and Dewey’s pragmatism and his concepts
of experience and inquiry? If Dewey was
not able to include the industrial society in
his educational practice, how may the
knowledge society be included?
I think that there are good reasons for
Dewey again being relevant – and relevant
to the knowledge society. A major reason is
that computers are the prevailing tools in to-
day’s work. This makes it possible to
re–unite work and school in a fairly easy
and obvious way. The weaving together of
computers and tele–communication creates
a tool that is first and foremost guided by a
certain kind of (exact programming–)lan-
guage, which, in turn, can be used as a me-
dia for information access and for commu-
nication. This way of using computers is not
very much different from using them in
schools and in everyday life. Using compu-
ters as ways for creating learning experi-
ences may, however, demand guidance, i.e.,
a teacher or tutor. The mere access to more
information and communication does not
ensure that the method of inquiry is learned
and transactions occur.
The use of computers in work and educa-
tion brings forward the issue of what action
98
10 See e. g. Lave’s (op. cit.) seminal study on the (lack
of) relation between school–learning and the everyday
use of calculation skills.
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and thinking is when the tool is a computer.
Schools and the educational system as a
whole have an important role to play in cre-
ating situations for learning experiences to
occur for learners. I.e., to point to how con-
tinuity between new forms of action (work-
ing on and with computers) may lead to new
forms of thinking. A re–visit to Dewey’s ed-
ucational thinking may inspire teachers on
all levels to do just that. A lot of work is,
however, necessary to help point to a con-
temporary kind of continuity between action
and thinking as well as its implications for
learning in the knowledge society.
A note on the work by and
about John Dewey
The Collected Works by John Dewey, and
the Works about John Dewey (Levine,
1996) is available in book form and as
CD–Roms. For Works about Dewey pub-
lished later than 1995, there is a supplemen-
tary list on the URL address of the John
Dewey Centre: http://www.siu.edu/~dew-
eyctr/. The Collected Works by Dewey is
published as Early Works (EW), Middle
Works (MW), and Later Works (LW). EW
covers the period from 1882–1898, and is
published in 5 volumes; MW covers the pe-
riod from 1899–1924, and is published in 15
volumes; and LW covers the period from
1925–1953, and is published in 17 volumes.
Besides the 37 volumes, an Index to the vol-
umes is published as a separate book. The
general editor of the Collected Work was Jo
Ann Boydston, and Southern Illinois Uni-
versity Press (Carbondale and Edwardsville)
published them between 1969–1991.
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